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ABSTRACT 
One of the criticisms against the new rules applicable to the granting of State aid to finance 
the provision of services of general economic interest (SGEI) in the ‘Almunia package’ is that 
enforcement is likely to be their weakest point. Similarly, in the more general setting of the 
‘private’ enforcement of State aid rules, the 2006 Study on the Enforcement of State Aid Law 
at National Level recommended that the European Commission create a common minimum 
standard of remedies applicable in all EU jurisdictions, stressing that ‘one possible means of 
creating such a standard would be to adopt a remedies directive for State aid cases, which 
could be modelled on the remedies directive for procurement cases’.  
Building up on these considerations, the extent to which the existing remedies within the 
system for the enforcement of EU public procurement rules provide an effective platform to 
enforce EU State aid rules (and, more specifically, those for the financing of SGEI) before 
public procurement review bodies and courts is assessed. The paper describes the main 
groups of cases where public procurement litigation ‘phagocytises’ State aid considerations. 
It then proceeds to explore the viability, from an EU law perspective, of configuring public 
procurement review bodies and courts as ‘State aid courts’ for the purposes of the 
simultaneous enforcement of both sets of rules in a single setting of ‘private’ litigation. It 
also submits that using the public procurement system in this way provides effective 
remedies for the enforcement of the Almunia Package for the financing of SGEI, and one 
that adds consistency in terms of harmonisation of the material rules to be applied. 
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One of the criticisms against the new rules applicable to the granting of State aid to 
finance the provision of services of general economic interest (SGEI)1 in the 
‘Almunia package’2 is that enforcement is likely to be their weakest point3. 
Similarly, in the more general setting of the ‘private’ enforcement of State aid rules, 
the 2006 Study on the Enforcement of State Aid Law at National Level4 pointed out 
that some of the difficulties for the enforcement of State aid rules through ‘private’ 
litigation were a result of the lack of clarity concerning the available remedies, and 
that enforcement would clearly benefit from the adoption of new regulatory 
instruments. Indeed, the 2006 Study recommended that the European Commission 
clarified the remedies available in case of breaches of State aid rules and created a 
common minimum standard applicable in all EU jurisdictions; and, more 
specifically, proposed that ‘one possible means of creating such a standard would be 
to adopt a remedies directive for State aid cases, which could be modelled on the 
remedies directive for procurement cases’5. 
Building up on these considerations, this paper aims to assess to what 
extent the existing remedies within the system for the enforcement of EU public 
procurement rules provide an effective platform to enforce EU State aid rules (and, 
more specifically, those for the financing of SGEI) before domestic public 
                                                          
1 As recently indicated, ‘the concept of SGEI appears in Articles 14 and 106(2) TFEU and in Protocol No 
26 to the TFEU, but it is not defined in the TFEU or in secondary legislation. The Commission has 
clarified […] that SGEI are economic activities which deliver outcomes in the overall public good that 
would not be supplied (or would be supplied under different conditions in terms of objective quality, 
safety, affordability, equal treatment or universal access) by the market without public intervention. A 
public service obligation is imposed on the provider by way of an entrustment and on the basis of a 
general interest criterion which ensures that the service is provided under conditions allowing it to fulfil 
its mission. The Court has established that SGEI are services that exhibit special characteristics as 
compared with those of other economic activities’; Commission Staff Working Document, Guide to the 
application of the European Union rules on state aid, public procurement and the internal market to 
services of general economic interest, and in particular to social services of general interest, 29 April 
2013, p. 21 ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/overview/new_guide_eu_rules_procurement_en.pdf. 
2 The expression ‘Almunia Package’ refers to the instruments adopted by the European Commission 
between December 2011 and April 2012 for the modernisation of SGEI rules. These are: 1) 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Quality Framework for Services 
of General Interest in Europe, Brussels, 20.12.2011, COM(2011) 900 final (the ‘SGEI Quality 
Framework’); 2) the Commission Decision of 20 December 2011 on the application of Article 106(2) of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to State aid in the form of public service 
compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general 
economic interest [OJ 2012/L 7/3] (the ‘SGEI Compensation Decision’); 3) Communication from the 
Commission on the application of the European Union State aid rules to compensation granted for the 
provision of services of general economic interest [OJ 2012/C 8/2] (the ‘SGEI Compensation 
Communication’); 4) Communication from the Commission—European Union framework for State aid 
in the form of public service compensation (2011) [OJ 2012/C 8/3] (‘2011 SGEI Framework’); and 5) 
Commission Regulation (EU) No 360/2012 of 25 April 2012 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid granted to undertakings 
providing services of general economic interest [OJ 2012/L 114/8] (the ‘SGEI de minimis Regulation’). 
The current rules are available at ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/sgei.html. 
3
 W Sauter, ‘The Altmark Package Mark II: New Rules for State Aid and the Compensation of Services 
of General Economic Interest’ (2012) 33(7) European Competition Law Review 307, 313. 
4 T Jestaedt, J Derenne and T Ottervanger (eds), Study on the Enforcement of State Aid Law at National 
Level, Part I — Application of EC State aid rules by national courts (Brussels, OPOCE, March 2006) 
34 ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/studies_reports.html. 
5 Ibid 35. 
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procurement review bodies and courts. Where a sufficient link between State aid 
and public procurement can be found, dealing with potential breaches of State aid 
rules in the setting of public procurement litigation could contribute to bridge the 
gap identified in their enforcement through ‘private’ litigation. Moreover, joint 
enforcement of both sets of rules should strengthen the internal consistency of EU 
economic law and shape public procurement enforcement in a more pro-
competitive (or at least, less competition-distortive) manner, as well as to contribute 
to a harmonization of the material rules and criteria applied across the board6. 
Given the almost indissoluble link between public procurement and State aid 
created by the Almunia package, this would create an effective and more consistent 
remedies system in the SGEI area. It will be argued that obtaining an effective 
‘procurement remedy’ will also serve the purpose of ensuring compliance with State 
aid rules (at least in its negative aspect, ie preventing the grant of illegal State aid 
through procurement, particularly of SGEI). 
In order to assess to what extent public procurement litigation is close to 
‘private’ State aid litigation, and to consider how to include State aid issues in the 
public procurement remedies system, after this introduction, section 2 maps the 
main groups of cases where litigation is concerned simultaneously with State aid 
and public procurement rules. Section 3 then focuses on the integration of State 
aid concerns in the system for the enforcement of the EU public procurement rules 
before domestic review bodies and courts, with a particular focus on the 
implications for SGEI. Section 4 concludes with some critical considerations. 
2. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF STATE AID AND PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
LITIGATION 
The relationship between State aid and public procurement rules has been debated 
for a long time from a substantive standpoint—while procedural rules have been 
markedly different in both areas of EU Economic Law. Such debate has generated a 
relatively large amount of litigation, mainly in three areas. Firstly, the award of 
public contracts was deemed as an instrument for the disguised granting of State 
aid and, consequently, public contracts have been challenged under the rules of 
Article 107(1) TFEU7 (§2.1). Secondly, there is a growing body of litigation whereby 
competitors of the recipients of unlawful State aid seek to get them disqualified 
from public tenders on the basis that such State aid allows them to submit 
abnormally low offers—which has resulted in a consolidation of the applicable rules 
in Article 55 of Directive 2004/188 (§2.2). Finally, in the specific area of the 
                                                          
6 I am grateful to Francisco Marcos for highlighting that, indeed, public procurement and competition 
rules (including State aid rules) are two sides of a same coin and share their basic goals of ensuring 
effective competition in the internal market—both generally, and in the public procurement setting. 
Hence, much more intense integration and substantive harmonisation than currently exists is 
necessary. For general discussion on the need of greater substantive convergence in these areas of EU 
economic law, see A Sanchez Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules (Oxford, Hart, 
2011). 
7 [2010] OJ C83/47. See also Tim Bruyninckx, ‘Recovery as a multidimensional remedy in EU State 
aid law’, working paper, CLaSF conference, on file with author. 
8 For the sake of this discussion, reference will only be made to Directive 2004/18/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the 
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financing of services of general economic interest (SGEI), the integration of public 
procurement and State aid rules create a particularly complex scenario that is 
clearly prone to litigation (§2.3). Each of these groups of cases will be assessed in 
turn and, as will be shown, the current rules and enforcement trends indicate that 
the bulk of the public procurement related State aid litigation will continue taking 
place within the limits of public procurement challenges. This will justify the analysis 
of the ways in which enforcement of State aid rules, particularly those for SGEI, 
can be sought before public procurement review bodies and courts (below §3). 
2.1. The use of public contracts as instruments to grant disguised State aid 
Given that public contracts meet most of the requirements in the definition of State 
aid under Article 107(1) TFEU, for a long time they have been considered as 
potential instruments to grant disguised illegal State aid if they provide an undue 
economic advantage to the public contractor9. Nonetheless, the debate is for now 
relatively settled against such possibility. The growing academic consensus and, 
more significantly, the official position of the European Commission, rule out that 
the award of a public contract can amount to the grant of State aid as long as it is in 
compliance with the current EU public procurement Directives. However, it must be 
stressed that, on the contrary, the absence of a tendering procedure does not 
preclude a finding that State aid and other competition rules have not been 
violated10. Generally, the underlying idea is that compliance with procurement 
rules ‘objectivises’ the award of the contract and, hence, excludes the element of 
‘undue economic advantage’ required by Article 107(1) TFEU—consequently 
eliminating all risks of disguised granting of State aid by means of public contracts. 
Therefore, the scope for litigation in this area is fundamentally limited to the 
public procurement arena as such. Disappointed bidders will challenge the public 
procurement decision on the basis of the applicable procurement rules. If the 
decision was properly adopted following all tender requirements, there will be no 
breach of either set of rules (and consequently, no room for separate State aid 
litigation). On the contrary, if there was a breach of public procurement rules, the 
illegal award decision (or the ensuing contract) will generally be set aside and/or 
rendered ineffective11 (and, again, there will be no need for follow up ‘private’ State 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts [2004] OJ 
L134/114. There are ‘specialised’ rules for the utilities and for the defence and security sectors. 
9 See the landmark case of Case T-14/96 BAI v Commission [1999] ECR II-139. For a criticism of the 
formal approach adopted by the European Commission in the enforcement of State aid rules in the 
public procurement context and further references, see Sanchez Graells, Public Procurement and the 
EU Competition Rules (2011) 118-21. 
10 See Case T-17/02 Olsen v Commission [2005] ECR II-2031 ¶¶237-9, confirmed on appeal by the 
CJEU, Case C-320/05 P Olsen v Commission and Spain [2007] ECR I-131. 
11 As a matter of principle, under the rules of the current EU public procurement remedies Directives, 
procedural breaches should result in an impossibility to award the contract or its ineffectiveness in 
case it was already awarded. However, provisions on ineffectiveness are still generating some relevant 
difficulties and, in some cases, Member States can substitute that remedy with money penalties 
against the contracting authority, and complement it with damages awards to the disappointed 
tenderers, which can make the litigation scenario more complicated (see below §3.1); J Golding and P 
Henty, ‘The New Remedies Directive of the EC: Standstill and Ineffectiveness’ (2008) 17 Public 
Procurement Law Review 146. On the duty to terminate illegally concluded contracts, see Case C-
503/04 Commission v Germany [2007] ECR I-6153 and the comments by S Treumer, ‘Towards an 
Obligation to Terminate Contracts Concluded in Breach of the EC Public Procurement Rules: The End 
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aid litigation, despite the concurrent breach of such rules—and regardless of any 
proceedings that the European Commission may wish to open against the 
infringing Member State). It seems clear that, somehow, public procurement 
phagocytises State aid litigation. 
In this respect, and under this interpretation12, State aid rules currently 
impose a very limited constraint on the use of public procurement as a means to 
grant disguised State aid. Determining whether an award was properly made 
according to the public procurement rules will generally be the acid test to decide 
whether State aid has been granted, which results in a circular test to establish in 
the first place whether the award of the public contract constitutes State aid in and 
by itself13. This limited scope for joint enforcement (and litigation) of State aid and 
public procurement rules rests in a very formalistic approach that relies on the 
apparent ‘rigidity’ and ‘objectivity’ created by public procurement rules—but does 
not actually prevent the granting of economic advantages in a significant number of 
cases. Its only advantage derives from legal certainty (for the awardee of the 
contract, even in very favourable economic terms), but excludes the economic gains 
derived from a stricter control of State aid implications of public procurement 
decisions.  
However, there is growing pressure for a policy change in this area due to 
the modifications very recently introduced in the reform of the EU public 
procurement Directives14. Given the perceived difficulties that public procurement 
rules create for the carrying out of activities in the public interest, the European 
Commission has aimed at their simplification and introduced more flexibility, 
particularly by creating more room for the use of negotiated procedures—ie by 
making a ‘competitive procedure with negotiation’ generally available to contracting 
authorities where ‘the needs of the contracting authority cannot be met without 
adaptation of readily available solutions’ or ‘the contract cannot be awarded without 
prior negotiations because of specific circumstances related to the nature, the 
complexity or the legal and financial make-up or because of the risks attaching to 
them’15. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
of the Status on Concluded Public Contracts as Sacred Cows’ (2007) 16(6) Public Procurement Law 
Review 371. See below (n 89) and accompanying text. 
12 For discussion, as well as for a proposal to reassess the current consensus on the basis of the very 
recent changes in EU public procurement rules, see A Sanchez Graells, ‘Public Procurement and State 
Aid: Reopening the Debate?’ (2012) 6 Public Procurement Law Review 205. 
13 Also referring to the circularity of the test, N Fiedziuk, ‘Putting Services of General Economic 
Interest Up for Tender: Reflections on Applicable EU Rules’ (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 87, 
89. 
14 The new version of the EU public procurement Directives was approved by the European 
Parliament on 15 January 2014 and is awaiting publication in the OJ of the European Union at the 
time of writing. The provisional versions of the new public sector procurement Directive are available 
as European Parliament legislative resolution of 15 January 2014 on the proposal for a directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on public procurement, P7_TA-PROV(2014)0025, at 
europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2014-0025.  
15 Article 26(4)(a)(i) and (iii) of the new public sector procurement Directive, which as clearly indicated 
by Recital (42) of the same Directive is likely to be interpreted in broad and flexible terms, following 
the blueprint of the WTO Government Procurement Agreement. See Sanchez Graells, ‘Public 
Procurement and State Aid’ (2012) 210. 
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Such increased flexibility in the public procurement rules frontally clashes 
with the assumption that they impose a tight procedure that works as a ‘black box’ 
and always ensures that the outcome is objective and excludes all possible 
economic advantages to the awardee of the contract. Hence, the feeble justification 
for the current position of the European Commission that compliance with EU 
public procurement rules excludes the risk of disguised State aid is in crisis, and 
the introduction of increased flexibility and the broadening of the scope for 
negotiated procedures will require new guidance as to the limits within which 
(negotiated) contractual conditions must remain for them to comply with EU State 
aid law. Given this change in the rules, it seems clear that there will be a new 
‘window of opportunity’ to litigate against the award of public contracts (exclusively) 
on the basis of State aid rules, regardless of the formal compliance with the 
(increasingly flexible) EU public procurement rules. However, this litigation will also 
be likely to take place within the remit of public procurement challenges. 
Another future possibility for litigation in terms of the granting of implicit 
State aid despite (formal) compliance with public procurement rules concerns 
renegotiation of the terms of the contract and contractual modifications16. To date, 
material changes in the scope of a public contract were considered as ‘fresh’ direct 
(illegal) awards and, consequently, they could be challenged both for lack of 
compliance of public procurement and State aid rules. However, a special regime 
for the modification of contracts during their term is foreseen in Article 72 of the 
new public procurement Directive. Under the new regime, contracts can be 
modified during their term without the need for a new tender procedure as long as 
the modifications are not substantial (ie where it does not render the contract 
materially different in character from the one initially concluded)—and, 
remarkably, Article 72(2) introduces a de minimis threshold of ‘substantiality’ 
whereby it will not be necessary to proceed to a new award where ‘the modification 
is below both of the following values: (i) the thresholds [for the application of the 
Directive]17 and (ii) 10 % of the initial contract value for service and supply contracts 
and below 15% of the initial contract value for works contracts […provided that the 
modification does] not alter the overall nature of the contract’ and always bearing in 
mind that ‘[w]here several successive modifications are made, the value shall be 
assessed on the basis of the net cumulative value of the successive modifications’. 
This possibility to introduce (non-substantial) modifications of the contract during 
its term also comes to question the logic followed by the Commission and the 
strength of the presumption that compliance with public procurement rules in the 
design and running of the tender ensure the absence of an undue economic 
advantage, given that those conditions can be altered later and those changes, 
while compliant with EU procurement law, could be a form of disguised State aid if 
                                                          
16 I am grateful to Carina Risvig Hansen for raising this issue. 
17 The value thresholds set out in Article 4 of the new Directive are €5,186,000 for public works 
contracts; €134,000 for public supply and service contracts awarded by central government 
authorities and design contests organised by such authorities; and € 207 000 for public supply and 
service contracts awarded by sub-central contracting authorities and design contests organised by 
such authorities. Therefore, contract modifications below these thresholds can still be relatively large 
in terms of (absolute) economic value. 
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they were not justified by the operative needs of the implementation of the contract 
or resulted in excessive (supra-competitive) compensation to the public contractor. 
In this scenario, after the approval of the new public procurement Directive, 
the increased flexibility both at award phase and during the execution of public 
contracts imposes the need to adopt a new method in order to find an infringement 
of the State aid rules (or rectius, in order to reverse the presumption that 
compliance with public procurement rules excludes the existence of any undue 
economic advantage). Indeed, it is necessary to go back to a less formalistic and 
more substantive analysis of the conditions in which a public contract is awarded.  
As suggested by Advocate General Jacobs, it is necessary to determine 
whether, despite having (formally) complied with procurement rules, the public 
contractor actually received an economic advantage because the terms of the 
contract (either originally, particularly if negotiated, or as amended) do not reflect 
normal market conditions18, bearing in mind that 
bilateral arrangements or more complex transactions involving mutual rights 
and obligations are to be analysed as a whole. Where for example the State 
purchases goods or services from an undertaking, there will be aid only if 
and to the extent that the price paid exceeds the market price19. 
It follows that, despite the growing opportunities for litigation, in the absence 
of a clear disproportion between the obligations imposed on the public contractor 
and the consideration paid by the public buyer (which needs to be assessed in light 
of such complex criteria as the risks assumed by the contractor, technical 
difficulty, delay for implementation, prevailing market conditions, etc)20; ‘general’ 
State aid rules will continue to generate relatively limited opportunities for public 
procurement litigation where it is difficult to establish the counterfactual ‘market 
price’21. This limitation will be particularly relevant in the case of SGEI, despite the 
fact that the Commission has developed a rather complicated system for the 
assessment of the elements of State aid implicit in their commissioning or 
procurement (below §2.3). 
2.2. Participation of recipients of State aid in public procurement 
A second area of significant overlap in public procurement and State aid 
enforcement (and litigation) involves the treatment of abnormally low tenders 
submitted by the recipients of State aid. The standard argument in these cases is 
that a tenderer should be excluded because it has received illegal State aid22—ie 
                                                          
18 As regards the importance of the analysis of ‘consideration’ in public contracts to exclude the 
existence of a gratuitous advantage to the government contractor, JA Winter, ‘Re(de)fining the Notion 
of State Aid in Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty’ (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 475, 487–501. 
19 Opinion of AG Jacobs in case C-126/01 GEMO ¶122. See also Opinion of AG Fennelly in case C-
251/97 France v Commission ¶19. 
20 In similar terms, A Doern, ‘The Interaction between EC Rules on Public Procurement and State Aid’ 
(2004) 13 Public Procurement Law Review 97, 117; and S Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities 
Procurement, 2nd edn (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 2005) 224-7. 
21 Which, in my opinion, claims for a further development of the principle of the market economy 
agent as a workable test; see A Sanchez Graells, ‘Bringing the “Market Economy Agent” Principle to 
Full Power’ (2012) 33(10) European Competition Law Review 35, 39. 
22 Study on the Enforcement of State Aid Law at National Level (2006) 34. 
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because the recipient of illegal State aid uses it to cross-subsidise its tender or, 
otherwise, is allowed to submit a tender in conditions unattainable for competitors 
that have not received State aid. 
It is worth stressing that this is an area that has shown intense litigation 
before domestic courts. As the 2006 Study indicated, ‘the number of State aid cases 
initiated in the context of public procurement (i.e. in situations where the claimant 
competes with the aid recipient in a public tender) is increasing; however, there are 
not many cases in which tenderers have successfully invoked violations of [EU] State 
aid law’23. Along the same lines, the 2009 Update of that study stressed that 
‘judges of lower instance courts play an important role in the enforcement of State aid 
rules, especially in public procurement and in the context of local public services’24,25. 
This relative importance of public procurement related State aid litigation seems 
likely to continue increasing in the future—particularly in some jurisdictions that 
are accumulating a relatively strong case law, such as Belgium, France, Germany, 
Italy or the Netherlands26. 
In this type of litigation, the relationship between public procurement and 
State aid rules is relatively straightforward and it is more clearly structured, given 
that the current rules have consolidated the case law of the CJEU. Indeed, current 
EU public procurement Directives include special rules concerned with the 
possibility to reject abnormally low tenders and, in particular, those tainted with 
illegal State aid27. Article 55(3) of Directive 2004/18 states that 
Where a contracting authority establishes that a tender is abnormally low 
because the tenderer has obtained State aid, the tender can be rejected on 
that ground alone only after consultation with the tenderer28 where the latter 
is unable to prove, within a sufficient time limit fixed by the contracting 
authority, that the aid in question was granted legally (emphasis added)29. 
Therefore, if a tenderer that has submitted an apparently abnormally low 
tender30 is the beneficiary of unlawful State aid (ie State aid granted without a prior 
                                                          
23 ibid 50-1.  
24 2009 Update to the 2006 Study on the Enforcement of State Aid Law at National Level 
ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/enforcement_study_2009.pdf. 
25 Indeed, public procurement related State aid cases represented 5% of the overall State aid litigation 
before the domestic courts of the EU-15 covered in the 2006 Study—which was up from 2% in 1999. 
2006 Study (n 4) 41-2. 
26 Indeed, most of these jurisdictions have continued to accumulate a significant number of public 
procurement related cases in the 2009 Update (n 24). 
27 See Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (2005) 531-9; and P Trepte, Public 
Procurement in the EU: A Practitioner’s Guide, 2nd edn (Oxford, OUP, 2007) 59-60 and 474-7; and GS 
Ølykke, ‘Submission of Low Price Tenders by Public Tenderers—Exemplified by Public Procurement of 
Railway Services in Denmark’ in UB Neergaard et al (eds), Integrating Welfare Functions into EU Law—
From Rome to Lisbon (Copenhagen, DJØF Publishing, 2009) 253. 
28 The type of consultation to be carried out involves a written inter partes procedure that must 
comply with the requirements of Article 55(2) of Directive 2004/18, as recently interpreted by the 
CJEU in Case C-599/10 SAG ELV Slovensko and Others [2012] ECR nyr. 
29 For discussion and further references, see Sanchez Graells (n 6) 326-9. 
30 The Directives do not include a definition of abnormally low offers and, consequently, there is a 
relevant debate going on concerning the boundaries of the concept and the methodologies that 
contracting authorities can use to identify them. For discussion, see GS Ølykke, Abnormally Low 
Tenders with an Emphasis on Public Tenderers (Copenhagen, DJØF, 2010). A proposal for screening of 
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notification to the European Commission and which cannot benefit from an 
exemption under any applicable block exemption regulations)31, the contracting 
authority can decide to exclude its tender without any further consideration and 
solely for that reason32. However, the use of this test of ‘legality’ rather than 
‘compatibility’ of State aid significantly reduces the effectiveness of this provision—
and there are doubts about whether the existence of incompatible State aid can be 
coupled with other reasons (remarkably, with the existence of a significant risk of 
non-performance or economic instability derived from a potential recovery decision) 
in order to reject abnormally low tenders under Article 55(1) and 55(2), rather than 
Article 55(3) of Directive 2004/18. It could even be questioned why the analysis of 
the duty to reject tenders tainted with illegal State aid is limited to the cases where 
they are abnormally low and cannot be extended also to cases where but for the 
existence of the illegal State aid, the tenderer would have submitted a much worse 
economic, not competitive offer33. 
It is worth emphasising that this shortcoming in the possibility to reject all 
instances of tenders tainted by illegal State aid may be partly corrected (exclusively 
in relation to abnormally low tenders) under the new public procurement rules, 
since the wording of the equivalent of Article 55(3) [to be renumbered as art 69(4)] 
states that 
Where a contracting authority establishes that a tender is abnormally low 
because the tenderer has obtained State aid, the tender may be rejected on 
that ground alone only after consultation with the tenderer where the latter is 
unable to prove, within a sufficient time limit fixed by the contracting 
authority, that the aid in question was compatible with the internal market 
within the meaning of Article 107 TFEU. Where the contracting authority 
rejects a tender in those circumstances, it shall inform the Commission thereof 
(emphasis added). 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
abnormally low offers was introduced in Article 69 of the original proposal for the new Directive, but it 
was abandoned in the 30 November 2012 and not reinserted in the final Compromise Text (n 14). 
31 Indeed, State aid will be ‘unlawful’ when it has been awarded in breach of the procedural 
obligations set out in Regulation 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the 
application of Article [88 TFEU] [1999] OJ L83/1. In contrast, illegal State aid will be ‘incompatible’ if 
it distorts or threatens to distort competition within the internal market and, consequently, cannot be 
exempted by the European Commission from the general prohibition of Article 107(1) TFEU. 
Therefore, the test of ‘legality’ is merely formal, whereas the test of ‘compatibility’ triggers a 
substantive assessment. In some cases, however, both tests will be complicated by the issue of 
whether an existing block exemption regulation covered the aid and, consequently, there was no need 
for the notification to the European Commission. 
32 Indeed ‘national courts have found it easier to identify elements of State aid in public procurement 
cases, and this has led to a number of judgments in which the national court has ruled in favour of the 
claimants and found the existence of unlawful State aid’, 2009 Update (n 24) 4. 
33 I am thankful to Sue Arrowsmith for this point. I am also thankful to Tim Bruyninckx for stressing 
that the possibility of rejecting sub-optimal offers by the contracting authority would raise monitoring 
costs and may have a perverse incentive in terms of participation of recipients of illegal State aid. As 
to the first point, obviously, rejection of sub-optimal offers should only be carried out if the 
contracting authority is in a position to do so, after having exhausted reasonable investigation 
possibilities—so, basically, this is just proposed as a possibility, but not a definitive obligation if it 
would otherwise impose an excessive and disproportionate burden on the contracting authority. As to 
the second point, discouraging recipients of State aid to participate in the first instance is a desirable 
collateral or spillover effect, in my view. 
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Such change will, in principle, significantly expand the scope of this 
provision to capture not only unlawful, but also incompatible State aid34. However, 
given the exclusive competence of the European Commission to determine the 
compatibility or lack thereof of State aid measures35, the practical effects of such 
modification may be seen to exclusively amount to an obligation to suspend award 
procedures while the procedure before the European Commission is completed (a 
view dismissed below §3.2)—which would not be a practical solution, in view of the 
relevance of timing in public procurement and its related litigation. 
On a different note, it is not clear that contracting authorities will have the 
proper incentives to investigate the existence of illegal (unlawful) State aid, since 
they may be interested in obtaining the implicit discount in the economic terms of 
the subsidised offer, or could have an interest in engaging in protectionism if the 
beneficiary of the State aid is a domestic producer36. In this regard, it has been 
stressed by the EU case law that this is ‘a fundamental requirement in the field of 
public procurement, which obliges a contracting authority to verify, after due hearing 
of the parties and having regard to its constituent elements, every tender appearing 
to be abnormally low before rejecting it’.37 Indeed, as the CJEU has clearly 
emphasised, this is a positive and unavoidable requirement, and ‘Article 55 of 
Directive 2004/18 does preclude […] a contracting authority from claiming […] that it 
is not obliged to request a tenderer to clarify an abnormally low price’.38 To be sure, 
contracting authorities are not expressly obliged to reject abnormally low tenders—
rather, their duty is just to identify suspect tenders and scrutinize them following 
the inter partes procedure established in the directive, whereby ‘the contracting 
authority must set out clearly the request sent to the tenderers concerned so that 
they are in a position fully and effectively to show that their tenders are genuine’.39 
In this regard, the CJEU has stressed that the contracting authority is  
under a duty, first, to identify suspect tenders, secondly to allow the 
undertakings concerned to demonstrate their genuineness by asking them to 
provide the details which it considers appropriate, thirdly to assess the 
merits of the explanations provided by the persons concerned, and, fourthly, 
to take a decision as to whether to admit or reject those tenders.40 
Hence, the rules of the directive exclusively impose procedural guarantees to 
be complied with by contracting authorities prior to rejecting apparently 
                                                          
34 For discussion on the treatment of abnormally low tenders under the proposal for a new Directive, 
see GS Ølykke, ‘How Should the Relation between Public Procurement Law and Competition Law Be 
Addressed in the New Directive?’ in C Tvarnø, GS Ølykke & C Risvig Hansen, EU Public Procurement: 
Modernisation, Growth and Innovation (Copenhagen, DJØF, 2012) 57, 66-75. 
35 Ie, the monopoly of enforcement of State aid rules under Article 107(2) and 107(3) TFEU, whereby 
national courts (and, by implication, national procurement authorities) do not have the power declare 
State aid compatible with those provisions. See Case C-199/06 CELF and Ministère de Culture et de la 
Communication [2008] ECR I-469 ¶38, and Commission Notice on the Enforcement of State Aid Law by 
National Courts [2009] OJ C85/1 ¶20. 
36 I am thankful to Sebastian Peyer for raising this issue. 
37 Case T-495/04 Belfass [2008] ECR II-781 ¶98. Similarly, Joined Cases C-285/99 and C-286/99 
Lombardini and Mantovani [2001] ECR I-9233 ¶51. 
38 Case C-599/10 SAG ELV Slovensko [2012] nyr ¶34. 
39 Case C-599/10 SAG ELV Slovensko [2012] nyr ¶31. 
40 Joined Cases C-285/99 and C-286/99 Lombardini and Mantovani [2001] ECR I-9233 ¶55. 
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abnormally low tenders;41 and, consequently, seem to be mainly oriented towards 
providing affected tenderers the opportunity to demonstrate that their tenders are 
genuine42—ie are primarily a mechanism to prevent discretionary (or arbitrary) 
decisions by contracting authorities43. Therefore, it seems necessary to couple 
these rules with a duty to go beyond the mere investigation and proceed to the 
rejection of the tenders once the existence of illegal State aid has been determined 
(below §3.3). Moreover, it seems necessary to ensure that competing tenderers have 
access to sufficient details about the winning bid to be able to identify the existence 
of State aid or, if that creates excessive transparency in the post-award debriefing 
process, that they can otherwise challenge the award decision on the grounds of 
the existence of State aid44. 
In any case, when the assessment of the abnormality of the tender tainted 
by illegal State aid (clearly for unlawful aid, but most likely equally for incompatible 
aid, or even with more intensity) reaches the courts, it seems that current judicial 
practice is less formal than one would expect upon reading Article 55(3) of Directive 
2004/18, and that domestic courts impose a strict analysis of the ‘abnormality’ of 
the tender and its causal link with the receipt of the (unlawful) State aid. The 
findings of the 2006 Study are worth noting45: 
it appears that in practice, in most cases, tenderers that relied on this clause 
have been unsuccessful. The reason is that a tenderer must show that the 
illegal aid actually had an impact on the tender by his competitor and made 
that tender “abnormally low”. It would appear that, in practice, it is almost 
impossible to make such a showing unless the aid is specifically related to 
the tender46. 
Therefore, it seems clear that litigation in this area faces the significant 
hurdle of the burden of proof concerning the effect of the illegal State aid in the 
specific terms and conditions of the tender submitted by the beneficiary of such 
aid. However, this is not specific to public procurement related cases and, more 
generally, it is one of the relevant obstacles to effective (decentralized) enforcement 
                                                          
41 Case 76/81 Transporoute [1982] ECR 417 ¶18; Case 103/88 Costanzo [1989] ECR 1839 ¶¶16-21; 
Joined Cases C-285/99 and C-286/99 Lombardini and Mantovani [2001] ECR I-9233 ¶¶33-45. 
42 Case 103/88 Costanzo [1989] ECR 1839 ¶18; Joined Cases C-285/99 and C-286/99 Lombardini 
and Mantovani [2001] ECR I-9233 ¶47; Case T-495/04 Belfass [2008] ECR II-781 ¶97. 
43 For further references and discussion, see A Sanchez Graells, ‘Rejection of Abnormally Low and 
Non-Compliant Tenders in EU Public Procurement: A Comparative View on Selected Jurisdictions’ in 
S Treumer and R Caranta (eds), Award of Public Contracts under EU Procurement Law, 4 European 
Procurement Law Series (Copenhagen, DJOF, 2013) 267-302, ssrn.com/abstract=2248590. 
44 On certain issues concerning the confidentiality of financial assessments of the tenders submitted 
by other undertakings, see Joined Cases T-339/10 and T-532/10 Cosepuri Soc. Coop. pA v European 
Food Safety Authority (EFSA) [2013] ECR nyr. For a short comment, see A Sanchez Graells, ‘Again on 
the protection of confidentiality in procurement evaluation: A step forward? (T-339/10 and T-
532/10)’, 29 January 2013, howtocrackanut.blogspot.co.uk/2013/01/again-on-protection-of-
confidentiality.html.  
45 2006 Study (n 4) 50-1. 
46 This is a very unlikely scenario, given that aid measures are usually not directly linked to tendering 
processes. For an interesting case, where the European Commission was expressly concerned with 
the beneficiary of State aid engaging in predatory pricing (ie submission of abnormally low tenders) in 
the rolling stock market, see Commission Decision of 7 July 2004 on the aid measures implemented 
by France for Alstom [2005] OJ L150/24 ¶220. 
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of the EU State aid rules47. In any case, it is worth stressing that the 2006 Report 
recommended that 
An efficient remedy would probably require that a tenderer that has received 
illegal State aid be excluded from the tender altogether, regardless of 
whether the State aid had a specific influence on the tender submitted. At 
least, one should consider [reversing] the burden of proof as to the effects of 
the illegal aid on the tender: the tenderer should not be excluded only if it is 
able to prove that the illegal aid had no effect on its bid48 (emphasis in the 
original). 
Beyond that recommendation, which ‘softer’ alternative of reversing the 
burden of proof is sensible and desirable, it can be argued that there is a general 
obligation to dismiss those tenders tainted with illegal State aid in order to ensure 
the effet utile of the provisions in Article 107 TFEU and Regulation 659/1999 and, 
consequently, that domestic courts (and procurement authorities) cannot make it 
excessively burdensome to challenge an abnormally low tender tainted with illegal 
State aid. In my opinion, a joint reading of Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European 
Union49 (ie the duty of sincere cooperation) and Article 69(4) of the new public 
procurement Directive is particularly clear in that respect (on this duty of sincere 
cooperation, see more discussion below §3.2). 
In this regard, the result of the very recent reform of the public procurement 
rules may create opportunities for a ‘new wave’ of litigation in this area, in order to 
test the limits of the new drafting requiring that the tenderer having submitted an 
apparently abnormally low tender justifies that it is (cross)subsidised by State aid 
compatible with the internal market within the meaning of Article 107 TFEU. 
Again, this litigation is highly likely to remain within the confines of procurement 
challenges and their judicial review. 
2.3. Financing services of general economic interest (SGEI) 
Finally, it is worth stressing that, in parallel to the general developments of the 
public procurement rules already mentioned that can have an impact on State aid 
related litigation (ie the introduction of more flexibility and room for negotiations, 
above §2.1; and a change in the rules concerning the treatment of abnormally low 
tenders tainted by illegal State aid, above §2.2), there is a third area of State aid 
procurement-related litigation that is due to gain relevance in the near future: that 
of the commissioning and financing of SGEI. 
                                                          
47 Indeed, ‘State aid cases are often complex and involve economic considerations (in particular for the 
qualification of aid in the event of an application of the market investor test or of the Altmark principles) 
for which national courts often lack the appropriate means to establish the factual information 
necessary for their decision. The burden of proof, therefore, is often a hurdle that leads to the claimant 
being unsuccessful’, 2009 Update (n 24) 3. On this issue, it is relevant to stress that the CJEU has 
adopted a permissive approach towards the use of domestic rules on evidence in order to allow courts 
to gather the necessary information and to reduce the information asymmetry faced by claimants. See 
Judgment of the European Court of Justice in case C-526/04 Laboratoires Boiron [2006] ECR I-7529 
at para 55. I am grateful to Tim Bruyninckx for this point. 
48 2006 Study (n 4) 51. 
49 [2010] OJ C83/13. 
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The reform of the rules on State aid applicable to SGEI approved by the 
European Commission in late 2011 and the first quarter of 2012 (the ‘Almunia 
package’) has shortened the already close links between this area of competition 
law and the enforcement of EU public procurement rules. It is worth stressing that 
the recent reforms of the EU public procurement rules—and, particularly, the 
adoption of special rules for social services within the ‘general’ public procurement 
Directive50, and of a new Directive on concession contracts51—have completed the 
revision of the regulatory package applicable to the control of State aid in the area 
of SGEI and provided legal clarification52 (and, equally, more flexibility) in the rules 
applicable to the selection of the undertaking to be entrusted with the public 
service obligations implicit in the provision of SGEI. However, they have also 
stressed the inherent tensions in the public procurement and the State aid ‘legs’ of 
this control system. 
A main principle that emerges from the Almunia package is that proper 
compliance with certain EU public procurement rules excludes the existence of 
State aid in the award of contracts for the provision of SGEI53. Similarly, even 
where State aid exists because the public procedures followed are not sufficient to 
‘ensure least cost to the community’, compliance with EU procurement rules makes 
it more likely that the aid can be declared compatible with the internal market—
particularly in view of the codification of the ‘fourth Altmark condition’54. This 
regulatory scenario seems very similar to the general issues discussed above (§2.1), 
where public procurement litigation is likely to phagocytise State aid litigation, 
given that compliance with certain public procurement rules will be the key to 
avoid State aid scrutiny under the Almunia Package. However, given the higher 
degree of sophistication shown by the European Commission in the treatment of 
public procurement requirements within the Almunia Package, this specific area of 
                                                          
50 See Articles 74 to 77 of the new public procurement Directive. See also the special regime for the 
reservation of contracts for certain services in Article 77, which is prone to create significant 
complications due to the, in my view, excessive leeway it grants to Member States. For discussion, see 
A Sanchez Graells & E Szyszczak, ‘Modernising Social Services in the Single Market: Putting the 
Market into the Social’, presented at the "Fostering Growth: Reinforcing the Internal Market" 
conference, in Madrid, Spain on the 28-29 October 2013 ssrn.com/abstract=2326157. 
51 The new concessions Directive was also approved by the European Parliament on 15 January 2014 
and is awaiting publication in the OJ of the European Union at the time of writing. The provisional 
version of the new public sector procurement Directive is available as European Parliament legislative 
resolution of 15 January 2014 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the award of concession contracts, P7_TA-PROV(2014)0024, available at 
europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201401/20140121ATT77950/20140121ATT77950EN.
pdf. For a critical appraisal of the proposal on concessions, see A Sanchez Graells, ‘What Need and 
Logic for a New Directive on Concessions, Particularly Regarding the Issue of their Economic 
Balance?’ (2012) 2 European Public Private Partnership Law Review 94. 
52 See Fiedziuk, ‘Putting Services of General Economic Interest Up for Tender’ (2013); C Bovis, ‘Public 
Procurement, State Aid and Services of General Economic Interest’ (2011) ERA era-
comm.eu/dalaw/kiosk/documentation/Public_procurement_issues/2011_05%20Bovis_paper.pdf. 
53 This is particularly clearly stated in several of the answers in the 2013 version of the Guide to the 
application of the European Union rules on state aid, public procurement and the internal market to 
services of general economic interest, and in particular to social services of general interest (n 1). 
54 For commentary, see the various contributions to E Szyszczak and JW van de Gronden (eds) 
Financing Services of General Economic Interest. Reform and Modernization, Legal issues of Services of 
General Interest (The Hague, TMC Asser / Springer, 2013). See also Sauter, ‘The Altmark Package 
Mark II’ (2012). 
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interaction of State aid, competition and public procurement rules deserves 
particularly careful analysis. 
Moreover, the approval of the new public procurement cannot leave the 
current scenario unchanged and it requires a revision of the guidance offered by 
the Commission regarding the enforcement of State aid, public procurement and 
competition rules in the area of SGEI and social services of general interest 
(SSGIs)55. The adoption of new EU public procurement and State aid rules and the 
concurrent reform of the structures for the provision of public services that almost 
all Member States are undertaking as a result of the economic crisis are likely to 
create some grey regulatory areas and opportunities for litigation. Hence, it is worth 
exploring their implications and potential contradictions in some detail. 
As already mentioned (above §2.1), compliance with public procurement 
rules is usually understood to exclude the existence of any undue economic 
advantage and, consequently, of State aid. In the specific field of the financing of 
SGEI, and following the conditions imposed by the CJEU in Altmark56, it is 
understood that the selection of the provider of such services pursuant to a public 
procurement procedure (which would allow for the selection of the tenderer capable 
of providing those services at the least cost to the community)57 excludes the 
existence of excessive remuneration and, consequently, any element of illegal State 
aid. However, in the Almunia Package, the European Commission elaborates on 
this assumption. In short, its understanding of the procurement requirement in 
Altmark has been clearly spelled out in the following terms: 
Based on the case law of the Court of Justice, a public procurement 
procedure only excludes the existence of State aid where it allows for the 
selection of the tenderer capable of providing the service at “the least cost to 
the community” (emphasis added).58 
And, in even more detailed terms, 
                                                          
55 Guide to the application of the European Union rules on state aid, public procurement and the internal 
market to services of general economic interest, and in particular to social services of general interest (n 
53) 20, where it is clearly stated that ‘It is planned to update the public procurement section of this 
guide once the new public procurement rules have been adopted in order to bring it in line with the new 
provisions’. 
56 Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg [2003] ECR I-7747. 
57 For discussion on whether the part between brackets constitutes an essential element or an obiter 
dictum of the CJEU, A Sanchez Graells, ‘The Commission’s Modernisation Agenda for Public 
Procurement and SGEI’ in E Szyszczak and JW van de Gronden (eds) Financing Services of General 
Economic Interest. Reform and Modernization, Legal issues of Services of General Interest (The Hague, 
TMC Asser / Springer, 2013) 161, 163-6. As indicated there, in my opinion, reading an absolute 
requirement for ‘lowest cost’ in the fourth Altmark condition seems highly contentious and at odds 
with the purpose and reality of public procurement rules. Therefore, it seems clear that a less 
restrictive approach, with a looser link to (absolute) ‘least cost’ implications can be extracted from the 
final findings of the CJEU in its reply to the preliminary questions put in Altmark, where the only 
requirement is that the undertaking which is going to discharge public service obligations is chosen in a 
properly designed and adequately run public procurement procedure aimed at avoiding economic 
inefficiency through competition (or, alternatively where that is at all possible, that the remuneration 
for the discharge of the public service obligations is determined against the benchmark of an efficient 
typical undertaking, well run and adequately provided with the relevant material means). 
58 SGEI Compensation Communication (n 2) ¶65. 
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... full compliance with open or restricted public procurement procedures 
awarded on the basis of either the lowest price or, under certain conditions, 
the most economically advantageous tender means that the contract is 
awarded at the “least cost to the community” as required by the Court as 
one of the conditions for excluding the existence of State aid (emphasis 
added).59 
Therefore, the approach adopted by the European Commission is rather 
restrictive and excludes the possibility to use a significant number of public 
procurement procedures and award criteria as part of a process aimed to exclude 
the existence of State aid in the commissioning of SGEI (given the restrictive 
approach likely to be undertaken in the analysis of those criteria different than 
price used to assess which is the most economically advantageous tender)60. On the 
flip of the same coin, by reducing the scope of the ‘public procurement exemption’, 
the guidance of the European Commission in the Almunia Package significantly 
extends the possibilities to litigate award decisions on the basis that they constitute 
illegal State aid—unless they are covered by either the SGEI de minimis Regulation, 
the SGEI Compensation Decision or the 2011 SGEI Framework.  
Under the structure of exemptions of the Almunia Package, the SGEI de 
minimis Regulation exempts aid given to an undertaking carrying out SGEI 
activities as long as it does not exceed €500,000 over any period of three fiscal 
years. Aid under this threshold must be granted in a manner that complies with 
the EU public procurement rules, but only as a general matter of EU law61, so an 
infringement of the public procurement rules would not affect the benefit of the 
exemption62. 
For aid that exceeds the de minimis threshold, its compatibility with the 
internal market will be determined in accordance with the SGEI Compensation 
Decision (which works as a block exemption regulation) and, failing that, under the 
2011 SGEI Framework63. The exemption under the SGEI Compensation Decision is 
generally available in three cases: i) to compensation for the provision of SGEI not 
related to transport and transport infrastructure where it does not exceed €15 
million per year; ii) without an annual limit, to compensation for the provision of 
SGEI by hospitals providing medical care, including, where applicable, emergency 
                                                          
59 SGEI Quality Framework (n 2) 6. For a sound criticism, JL Buendia Sierra and JM Panero Rivas 
‘The Almunia Package: State Aid and Services of General Economic Interest’ in E Szyszczak and JW 
van de Gronden (eds) Financing Services of General Economic Interest. Reform and Modernization, Legal 
issues of Services of General Interest (The Hague, TMC Asser / Springer, 2013) 125, 137. 
60 For interesting discussion, even if prior to the adoption of the Almunia Package, see P Dethlefsen, 
‘Public Services in the EU—Between State Aid and Public Procurement Rules’ (2007) Public 
Procurement Law Review NA53. 
61 See Recital (21) of the SGEI de minimis Regulation, which indicates that ‘This Regulation should 
apply without prejudice to the requirements of Union law in the area of public procurement or of 
additional requirements flowing from the Treaty or from sectoral Union legislation’. 
62 In this regard, Case T-17/02 Olsen v Commission [2005] ECR II-2031 ¶¶238-9, confirmed on appeal 
by the CJEU, Case C-320/05 P Olsen v Commission and Spain [2007] ECR I-131. As already 
mentioned (n 10), the CJEU has confirmed that the absence of a tendering procedure does not 
preclude a finding that State aid rules have not been violated. 
63 On the hierarchy of the documents in the Almunia Package and the logic for their application, see E 
Szyszczak, ‘Modernising State Aid and the Financing of SGEI’ (2012) 3(4) Journal of European 
Competition Law & Practice 332. 
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services (and ancillary activities); and iii) without an annual limit, to compensation 
for the provision of SGEI meeting social needs as regards health and long term 
care, childcare, access to and reintegration into the labour market, social housing 
and the care and social inclusion of vulnerable groups64. Therefore, the 2011 SGEI 
Framework will only be applicable to SGEI of large dimensions (to the exclusion of 
social SGEI) and to those of a medium scale (in all sectors) that fail to meet all the 
requirements in the SGEI Compensation Decision.  
It is important to stress that, in contrast with the SGEI de minimis 
Regulation, both the SGEI Compensation Decision and the 2011 SGEI Framework 
mandate compliance with public procurement rules as a condition for exemption of 
the aid granted to the undertaking entrusted with the SGEI65. Therefore, failing to 
comply with the public procurement requirements as set out in these documents 
will imply that the State aid given to the undertaking cannot be exempted under 
Article 106(2) TFEU66. In short, then, strict compliance with public procurement 
rules is a compatibility requirement for all SGEI State aid, to the only exception of 
de minimis aid (which, in any case, would most likely remain outside the scope of 
the EU public procurement rules due to the low value of the contracts and the 
likely inexistence of cross-border interest). At first sight, this may run contrary to 
the case law of the European Courts, which in Olsen held that 
it is not apparent either from the wording of Article [106(2) TFEU] or from 
the case-law on that provision that a general interest task may be entrusted 
to an operator only as a result of a tendering procedure. In those conditions, 
contrary to the applicant’s claims, there can be no requirement for the 
contested decision to contain a particular statement of reasons for the 
absence of such a procedure67. 
However, precisely by introducing the requirement of compliance with public 
procurement procedures—and, as will be explored, not any procedures, but only 
certain of the ones envisaged in the EU public procurement rules, and under 
relatively demanding conditions—the European Commission is creating such an 
                                                          
64 It also covers exemptions to ports and airports, depending on the number of travellers that use 
them. For details, see Article 2(1) of the SGEI Compensation Decision. 
65 Fiedziuk (n 13) 97; A Sinnaeve, ‘What’s New in SGEI in 2012?—An Overview of the Commission’s 
SGEI Package’ (2012) 11(2) European State Aid Law Quarterly 347, 352. 
66 This has been criticised as an excess on the part of the European Commission. See Fiedziuk (n 13) 
97-9, who considers that ‘by establishing a criterion of compliance with the applicable public 
procurement rules for State aid to be found compatible, the Commission seems to be transgressing the 
limits of its broad discretion in shaping the application of Article 106(2) TFEU by ignoring the purpose of 
State aid rules in relation to which it serves as a derogation. Paradoxically thus, the Commission may be 
actually distorting Member States’ incentives to tender the provision of SGEI created by the [CJEU] in 
the Altmark judgment’. Cfr. Sauter (n 3) 311, who finds no problem in such approach and considers 
that ‘The relationship with the public procurement rules that follows from the Altmark case itself is 
strengthened in the new Framework by a provision that aid which is granted in violation of the 
procurement rules is considered to be contrary to the interest of the Union within the meaning of TFEU 
art. 106(2)’. 
67 Case T-17/02 Olsen v Commission [2005] ECR II-2031 ¶239. See Dethlefsen, ‘Public Services in the 
EU’ (2007) NA62, who considered that this was not in contradiction with the public procurement rules 
and that the Court limited itself to declare that ‘an exemption from competition and State aid under art. 
[106(2) TFEU] could be available even if the contract had not been awarded in a tendering procedure 
[…] nothing excludes other Treaty provisions and principles from requiring the very same task to be put 
up for competition’. 
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obligation through secondary legislation and soft law (which can be much more 
contentious68) and, consequently, the Olsen case law is effectively overridden69. 
Indeed, even if all documents in the ‘Almunia Package’ are careful to indicate 
that they do not alter in any manner the general obligations derived from the EU 
public procurement rules—ie that they apply without prejudice of the requirements 
imposed by EU law in the field of procurement—one can wonder whether that is 
the case. A critical reading of the documents shows how there is a significant push 
for an ‘expanded application’ of public procurement rules in full (even when they are 
not directly applicable), particularly in view of the ‘preferred route’ approach to 
procurement that the Almunia Package shows vis-à-vis the alternative means of 
compliance with the fourth Altmark condition (that is, a benchmark appraisal 
against a theoretical efficient SGEI supplier). This can clearly be seen in the SGEI 
Compensation Communication, where it is stated that: 
The simplest way for public authorities to meet the fourth Altmark criterion 
is to conduct an open, transparent and non-discriminatory public 
procurement procedure in line with [Directive 2004/18 …] the conduct of 
such a public procurement procedure is often a mandatory requirement 
under existing Union rules. […] Also in cases where it is not a legal 
requirement, an open, transparent and non-discriminatory public 
procurement procedure is an appropriate method to compare different 
potential offers and set the compensation so as to exclude the presence of 
aid.70 
Such an approach to the use of public procurement as a device to exclude 
State aid can be misleading, since it presents the discharge of public procurement 
obligations as an advantage that contracting entities can benefit from (at their 
discretion)—whereas the conduct of procurement procedures that ensure the 
effectiveness of the general principles in the Treaties is not optional, but a 
mandatory requirement under EU law, even when the EU procurement Directives 
are not or are only partially applicable (as long as there is a cross-border interest, 
which is likely to happen when the SGEI de minimis Regulation is not applicable)71. 
Therefore, it is not the easiest way to meet the fourth Altmark condition, but the 
                                                          
68 For general discussion on the use of soft law as a main instrument of policy and regulation in State 
aid and, more generally, in EU competition policy, see O Stefan, Soft Law in Court. Competition Law, 
State Aid and the Court of Justice of the European Union (The Hague, Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 
2012). See also A Sanchez Graells, ‘Soft Law and the Private Enforcement of the EU Competition 
Rules’, in JL Velasco San Pedro (ed), Private Enforcement of Competition Law (Valladolid, Lex Nova, 
2011) 507-20. 
69 Which can (and will) be criticised in view of the restriction that this imposes on the potentially 
separate analysis of public procurement and State aid rules, particularly by commentators that 
consider that breaches of public procurement rules should not have an effect on the analysis under 
Articles 106(2) and 107(1) TFEU, as purchases outside the tight public procurement procedures are 
apt to exclude the existence of any undue economic advantage, such as argued by S Arrowsmith, The 
Law of Public and Utilities Procurement, 3rd edn (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2013) forthcoming. The 
same arguments were already explored in the 2nd edition of her book. 
70 SGEI Compensation Communication (n 2) ¶¶63-4. 
71 On the mandatory application of the general principles of TFEU to all procurement activities and 
the positive obligations that it implies, see C Risvig Hansen, Contracts not covered, or not fully covered, 
by the Public Sector Directive (Copenhagen, DJØF, 2012). Regarding the type of arrangements that 
must be considered a ‘contract’ and, therefore, subjected to procurement rules, see GS Ølykke, ‘The 
Definition of a “Contract” Under Article 106 TFEU’ in E Szyszczak et al. (eds), Developments in 
Services of General Interest, (The Hague, TMC Asser Press/Springer, 2011) 103. 
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only way that contracting entities can meet their general obligations under EU 
public procurement law.  
Moreover, this approach suggests that the European Commission favours 
the full subjection of SGEI tendering to the rules of the EU public procurement 
Directives and the national rules that transpose them72, but only as long as they 
are applied in the specific terms of the SGEI Compensation Communication (which 
the Commission intends to amend sometime soon, once new Union rules on public 
procurement have been adopted, in order to clarify the relevance for State aid 
purposes of the use of the procedures foreseen in these new rules)73. This is in clear 
contrast with the new light-touch regime applicable to the procurement of social 
and other specific services under articles 74 to 77 of the new procurement 
Directive, which create a light-touch regime that goes as far as to allow for the 
existence of reserved contracts for certain services (art 77). Therefore, there seems 
to be a clear divergence between the new procurement rules applicable to the 
contracting of (some) SGEIs and the presumption that compliance therewith 
suffices to ensure State aid law compliance too. Therefore, if the Commission is to 
maintain the view that not any type of procurement-compliant procedure suffices to 
(simply) benefit from the Altmark exemption, but that only those tailored to the 
guidelines of the SGEI Compensation Communication do—there will be problems of 
reconciliation of the existing State aid guidance and the newly agreed public 
procurement rules (which seem to include a very clear political message from 
Member States, which have created a carve out in the procurement of social 
services that will trigger litigation in the SGEI area).  
Furthermore, in my view, the position of the Commission in the 2011 SGEI 
Framework for those cases where SGEI compensation does not meet the criteria in 
the SGEI Compensation Communication has a similar defect, since it states that 
Aid will be considered compatible with the internal market on the basis of 
Article 106(2) of the Treaty only where the responsible authority, when 
entrusting the provision of the service to the undertaking in question, has 
complied or commits to comply with the applicable Union rules in the area of 
public procurement. This includes any requirements of transparency, equal 
treatment and non-discrimination resulting directly from the Treaty and, 
where applicable, secondary Union law. Aid that does not comply with such 
rules and requirements is considered to affect the development of trade to an 
                                                          
72 This is radically contrary to proposals to reduce the burden of public procurement rules in the 
tendering of SGEI on the basis of Article 106(2) TFEU, as proposed by Fiedziuk (n 13) 110-3 and HM 
Stergiou, ‘The Increasing Influence of Primary EU Law and EU Public Procurement Law: Must a 
Concession to Provide Services of General Economic Interest be Tendered?’ in JW van de Gronden 
(ed), The EU and WTO Law on Services: Limits to the Realisation of General Interest Policies within the 
Services Markets?, European Monograph Series (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 
2009) 159, 184. However, applying the public procurement rules to putting the task of conducting the 
services of general economic interest up for competition has not been considered an obstruction to the 
development of those services and cannot be the object of an automatic exemption under art 106(2) 
TFEU; see Opinion of AG Stix–Hackl in case C-532/03 Commission v Ireland ¶¶98-108. Along the 
same lines, see Opinion of AG Mazák in case C-480/06 Commission v Germany ¶¶56-63. See also 
Sanchez Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules (n 9) 126-7. 
73 SGEI Compensation Communication (n 2) ¶63 and fn 88. 
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extent that would be contrary to the interests of the Union within the 
meaning of Article 106(2) of the Treaty (emphasis added).74 
Even if the wording of the 2011 SGEI Framework is clearer in presenting the 
non-discretionary obligation to comply with primary and secondary EU 
procurement law, the consequences that it attaches to non-compliance can create a 
circular test—which can be particularly prone to litigation in view of the specific 
reference to the general principles derived from the EU Treaties and the final 
indication that failure to comply with such requirements (automatically) ‘would be 
contrary to the interests of the Union [under] Article 106(2) of the Treaty’. Surely, 
the requirements cannot be interpreted in absolute terms and the analysis will 
have to focus on material compliance with public procurement rules and 
principles75. Otherwise, the test could become even more formal than it currently is 
(above §2.1) and lead to an excessive number of findings of illegal State aid to SGEI 
(which would be particularly disproportionate if they were exclusively concerned 
with formal irregularities that would not have affected the outcome of the tender or 
the main conditions of the award in a substantial manner)76. 
Summing up, under the approach (re)adopted by the European Commission, 
i) if compliance with EU procurement rules in a manner that ‘allows for the 
selection of the tenderer capable of providing the service at the least cost to the 
community’ ensures meeting the fourth Altmark criterion (ie no existence of State 
aid), ii) compliance with procurement rules (at a lower level of restrictiveness, 
particularly for social services?) ensures exemption under the SGEI Compensation 
Communication or compatibility under the 2011 SGEI Framework (if all other 
conditions are met, and at least until this guidance is revised in view of the new 
public procurement rules), and iii) non-compliance with EU procurement rules 
(primary and/or secondary, where applicable) determines that the SGEI scheme 
cannot benefit from Article 106(2) TFUE (except if de minimis); then, the analysis 
seems once more limited to whether procurement rules where complied with or not. 
Indeed, in this enforcement framework, non-compliance will imply the double, 
simultaneous breach of procurement and SGEI State aid rules, while compliance 
with EU public procurement rules would be a safeguard for the application of the 
SGEI rules—as long as the other Altmark conditions are met, which seems 
relatively easy (inasmuch as the terms of the tender and the contract are clear 
                                                          
74 2011 SGEI Framework (n 2) ¶19. 
75 This is one of the open challenges in the area of EU public procurement where, rather 
counterintuitively, an excessively strict requirement of full compliance with all (minute) rules can be 
self-defeating and jeopardise the attainment of the goals pursued by the contracting authorities. For 
discussion, see A Sanchez Graells, ‘Rejection of Abnormally Low and Non-Compliant Tenders in EU 
Public Procurement’ (2013), forthcoming ssrn.com/abstract=2248590. 
76 Similarly, the General Court has recently excluded the obligation to award damages to disappointed 
tenderers where the breaches of the EU public procurement rules where ‘merely’ formal and 
insufficient to have altered the outcome of the tender. In the case at hand, the insufficient motivation 
of the award decision and the lack of disclosure of certain information during the debriefing of a 
disappointed bidder would not have altered the award of the contract and, consequently, it did not 
have a right to be compensated; see Case T-668/11 VIP Car Solutions v Parliament [2013] ECR nyr. 
Analogously, the same breaches would not support an automatic finding of illegal State aid under 
Article 107(1) TFEU that would of necessity be contrary to the interests of the Union under Article 
106(2) TFEU. A more substantive approach would be necessary, as advocated by AG Jacobs and 
Fennelly and as discussed above §2.1. 
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regarding the definition of the SGEI as the contractual object, the conditions of the 
entrustment and the design of the compensation mechanism). 
Therefore, once again, this tends to perpetuate the very formalistic approach 
adopted by the European Commission in the analysis of public procurement as a 
tool to grant disguised State aid (above §2.1)77 and also in this area, the bulk of the 
litigation will take place within public procurement procedures. 
3. INTEGRATING STATE AID ISSUES IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT LITIGATION 
As seems clear from the analysis in the previous section, the bulk of the public 
procurement related State aid ‘private’ litigation will continue taking place within 
the limits of public procurement challenges, be it because determining compliance 
(or lack of) with EU public procurement rules will determine the (in)existence of 
State aid—either generally under Article 107(1) TFEU, or under Article 106(2) TFEU 
in the case of SGEI—or because the assessment of tenders affected by illegal State 
aid needs to take place as part of the tender process, in an inter partes phase of the 
public procurement procedure [art 55(3) dir 2004/18 and 69(4) of the new dir]. 
Given the clear push towards integrating public procurement compliance as a 
requisite for the declaration of compatibility of State aid in the Almunia Package, it 
should not be surprising that the European Commission continues to push for the 
development and consolidation of joint methods of enforcement78—not least 
because, in the absence of a unified approach towards the regulation of remedies in 
economic or market-related cases79, alternative ways to strengthen enforcement in 
these relevant areas of EU economic law must be sought. 
Consequently, it seems clear that the rules and recommendations on the 
enforcement of State aid rules by the courts of the Member States need to be 
adapted (or transferred) in this specific setting to the particularities of the system 
for the enforcement of public procurement rules before the competent review bodies 
and (administrative) courts (below §3.1). Moreover, seeking to integrate State aid 
considerations in the system for the enforcement of public procurement rules may 
achieve the same practical results as creating a specific ‘remedies’ Directive for 
State aid cases (as proposed by the experts involved in the 2006 Report80) and 
could contribute to strengthening the enforcement of State aid rules in the public 
procurement setting. This section attempts such an integration of relevant State 
aid issues in the system for the enforcement of public procurement rules, with 
special attention on the implications for SGEI. It focuses on the main areas 
                                                          
77 With similar concerns, see B Heuninckx, ‘Defence Procurement: The Most Effective Way to Grant 
Illegal State Aid and Get Away With It … Or Is It?’ (2009) 46 Common Market Law Review 191. 
78 Along the same lines, although raising the issue that the General Court and the CJEU may not 
concur with this strategy of the European Commission, at least when Article 258 TFEU infringement 
procedures are involved (which is a different aspect of this trend of convergence), Fiedziuk (n 13) 97-8. 
79 As highlighted by Sebastian Peyer in one of his comments, this discussion is linked to the issue of 
remedies in the field of enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. In that regard, general future 
developments in the area of ‘private’ competition law remedies will be relevant. See the Proposal of 11 
June 2013 for a Directive on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for 
infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the EU, COM(2013) 404 
ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/proposal_directive_en.pdf. 
80 2006 Study (n 4) 35. 
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identified in the Notice on the Enforcement of State Aid Law by National Courts, 
where it is clear that the main role for domestic courts (and authorities) in the 
enforcement of State aid rules focuses on preventing the payment of unlawful aid, 
imposing interim measures against unlawful aid, and granting relief for the 
damages suffered by competitors and other third parties81. 
After providing a succinct description of the public procurement remedies 
system envisaged in EU law (§3.1), exploring the viability of a system of ‘single 
private’ litigation based on both public procurement and State aid issues, 
particularly in view of the lack of competence of domestic courts (and review 
bodies) concerning declarations of compatibility of State aid (§3.2), and discussing 
the existence of a general duty to ensure the effet utile of State aid rules across the 
public procurement remedies system (§3.3); this section explores the following 
specific issues: the legal standing of disappointed tenderers, competitors and third 
parties to challenge procurement decisions with State aid implications (§3.4); the 
commonality of the rules on standstill and (additional) interim measures (§3.5); 
and, finally, the possibility to claim damages and their subjection to domestic law 
of the Member States (§3.6). As the analysis will show, there seems to be no 
impediment in the EU rules of State aid and public procurement that prevent their 
joint enforcement in procurement challenges. 
3.1. Brief description of the public procurement remedies system 
EU public procurement rules include a set of Remedies Directives82 that establish a 
minimum standard for the challenge and review of procurement decisions covered 
by the substantive procurement Directives83 (although certain remedies may also 
be required for contracts not or not fully covered84, and some Member States have 
extended the same remedies to public procurement not covered by EU rules and 
principles)—and, beyond that minimum standard, ‘remedies and procedural law 
concerning breaches of [EU public procurement] law are considered matters for the 
national legislator, according to the principle of national and remedial autonomy’85. 
                                                          
81 To be clear, national courts also have a salient role in the recovery of unlawful aid (regardless of its 
compatibility) and the recovery of illegality interests, as stress in the Notice on the Enforcement of State 
Aid Law by National Courts (n 35) ¶26. However, in view of the anticipatory nature of the public 
procurement remedies system, these additional roles will remain largely marginal, if not non-existent 
in this particular setting. 
82
 Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC, as amended by Directive 2007/66/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2007 amending Council Directives 89/665/EEC and 
92/13/EEC with regard to improving the effectiveness of review procedures concerning the award of 
public contracts [2007] OJ L 335/31. Collectively referred to as ‘Remedies Directives’. 
83 For a basic description of the enforcement system, see S Treumer, ‘Remedies and Enforcement’ in S 
Arrowsmith (ed), EU Public Procurement Law: An Introduction (2010) 288-97 
nottingham.ac.uk/pprg/documentsarchive/asialinkmaterials/eupublicprocurementlawintroduction.p
df. For more in-depth analysis, including interesting comparative assessments, see S Treumer and F 
Lichère, Enforcement of the EU Public Procurement Rules, 3 European Procurement Law Series 
(Copenhagen, DJØF, 2011). 
84 A Brown, ‘EU Primary Law Requirements in Practice: Advertising, Procedures and Remedies for 
Public Contracts outside the Procurement Directives’ (2010) 19(5) Public Procurement Law Review 169; 
S Treumer, ‘Enforcement of the EU Public Procurement Rules: The State of Law and Current Issues’, 
in ibid and F Lichère, Enforcement of the EU Public Procurement Rules, 3 European Procurement Law 
Series (Copenhagen, DJØF, 2011) 17, 44-9; and, for further detail, C Risvig Hansen, Contracts not 
covered or not fully covered by the Public Sector Directive (Copenhagen, DJØF, 2012) 251-316. 
85 Treumer ‘Enforcement of the EU Public Procurement Rules’ (2011) 17. 
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The purpose of the Remedies Directives is to create the possibility for disappointed 
tenderers and other sufficiently interested parties to challenge procurement 
decisions (and, remarkably, contract award decisions) before any public contract is 
signed or, if the contract has been executed anyway, to seek its ineffectiveness. 
Depending on the decisions of the Member States in the transposition of the 
Remedies Directives, such challenges can be brought either before specialised 
review bodies (administrative tribunals, some of them with quasi-judicial structure 
and powers) or (administrative) courts86. Even if the legal basis that can support a 
challenge is not clearly defined in the Remedies Directives—which only indicate 
that ‘Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that […] decisions 
taken by the contracting authorities may be reviewed effectively and, in particular, as 
rapidly as possible […] on the grounds that such decisions have infringed Community 
law in the field of public procurement or national rules implementing that law’ [art 
1(1) dir 89/665] and that ‘Member States shall ensure that the measures taken 
concerning the review procedures […] include provision for the powers to […] either 
set aside or ensure the setting aside of decisions taken unlawfully’ [art 2(1)(b) dir 
89/665]—the general position in the Member States is that any infringement of the 
applicable EU rules constitutes a sufficient ground for the challenge87. 
Remarkably, the Remedies Directives provide for a set of minimum remedies 
that Member States must make available to the challengers of procurement 
decisions88, which include: i) a standstill obligation that prevents the signature of a 
contract before at least 10 days have elapsed since the publication of the award 
decision (which is extended to 15 days if electronic means of communication are 
not used); ii) interim measures (in case the standstill proves insufficient and other 
                                                          
86 Indeed, most EU jurisdictions have located the competence for the review of public procurement 
decisions in either specialised administrative review bodies or tribunals, or directly assigned them to 
the administrative courts. In any case, the decisions of the specialised bodies are subject to judicial 
review. According to the European Commission’s Annual Public Procurement Implementation Review 
2012 ‘First-instance independent reviews are carried out by judicial bodies in 13 MS (DE, FI, FR, EE, EL, 
IE, IT, NL, PT, LT, LU, SE and UK), and by an administrative body in 14 MS (AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DK, ES, 
HU, LV, MT, PL, RO, SI and SK). The actual difference between the type of review body chosen is less 
acute than the terms ‘administrative’ or ‘judicial’ would suggest. On the one hand, many of the 
administrative bodies in the MS are quasi-judicial in nature (information explicitly substantiating this 
was available from AT, HU and SI, but the situation is likely to be similar in many other countries). In 
these countries the standing of the persons deciding the cases is also similar to a judge. On the other 
hand, in some of the MS which provide for judicial review, the courts work to special, shorter deadlines 
for giving a decision’ 21 [Brussels, 9 October 2012, SWD(2012)342 final] 
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/implementation/20121011-staff-working-
document_en.pdf. 
87 However, some significant disparities remain and, for instance, the UK system tends to focus on 
major formal violations, whereas the French courts tend to look for violations of each and every 
procurement rule; for more discussion, see R Caranta, ‘The Comparatist’s Lens on Remedies in Public 
Procurement’ (2011) 2 ECLI European and Comparative Law Issues Working Papers 5-7 
workingpapers.iuse.it 
88 See Treumer (n 84) 28-44. Due to the different options made by Member States in the transposition 
of the Remedies Directives, the systems still present relatively large differences; Caranta, The 
Comparatist’s Lens on Remedies in Public Procurement (2011). Nonetheless, the effectiveness of the 
public procurement rules is perceived to have increased across all jurisdictions. Indeed, the data 
reported in the Annual Public Procurement Implementation Review 2012 (n 86) 31-4 show that, on 
average, 8.5% of public procurement procedures are subjected to review procedures, with some 
countries reaching almost 20%. Around one third of complainants prevail in their claims in almost all 
jurisdictions. Even if quantitative assessments may be of limited value, this seems to indicate that 
(relatively) effective remedies are available in the Member States. 
 22 
provisional relief is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of a final decision); iii) the 
annulment of any challenged procurement decision, including the contract award 
decision, if it is proven unlawful; iv) ineffectiveness of the contracts awarded in 
breach of the EU procurement rules89 (which is mandatory for the most flagrant 
breaches, as a matter of EU law) or, if ineffectiveness is not an option, a set of 
alternative monetary penalties to be imposed on the contracting authority at fault; 
and v) the right to claim damages90. In any case, Member States retain the 
discretion to expand this list of remedies and to create stricter ones. 
3.2. The viability of a system of ‘single private’ litigation based on both public 
procurement and State aid issues 
As briefly mentioned (above §3), the main role for domestic courts (and authorities) 
in the enforcement of State aid rules focuses on: i) preventing the payment of 
unlawful aid (or imposing interim recovery of the unlawful aid already paid, 
regardless of its compatibility with EU law, pending a Commission decision to that 
effect), ii) imposing interim measures against unlawful aid (mainly aiming to secure 
future recovery decisions), and iii) granting relief for the damages suffered by 
competitors and other third parties. Given that this role is fundamentally equal to 
what is expected from public procurement review bodies and courts, and that the 
Remedies Directives provide them with the powers to do so effectively (as briefly 
discussed above §3.1), as a matter of principle, there seems to be no difficulty in the 
configuration of public procurement review bodies and courts as ‘State aid courts’ for 
the purposes of the simultaneous enforcement of both sets of rules in a single setting 
of ‘private’ litigation. However, given the different distribution of competences 
between the Commission and the Member States for the enforcement of public 
procurement and State aid rules, a further check is necessary to ensure the 
viability of such system. 
One of the apparent obstacles for the joint enforcement of public 
procurement and State aid rules, particularly where breaches of public 
procurement law are found, is that domestic review authorities and the courts 
cannot reach a final decision on the compatibility of the aid91. Consequently, 
defendants may claim that, despite the breach of the public procurement rules—
and, consequently, the unavailability of the ‘public procurement exemption’ under 
Article 107(1) TFEU and the several mechanisms of exemption under Article 106(2) 
TFEU (above §2)—the aid implicit in the award of the public contract is still 
compatible with Article 107(1) TFEU under the general rules. In that case, domestic 
review bodies and courts would need to freeze their review procedures until the 
                                                          
89 Moreover, the rules on ineffectiveness and termination of contracts can be expanded by Article 73 of 
the new public procurement Directive (n 14). 
90 On the use of damages as a remedy in procurement, see S Treumer, ‘Damages for Breach of the EC 
Public Procurement Rules. Changes in European Regulation and Practice’ (2006) 15 Public 
Procurement Law Review 159, and all the contributions to D Fairgrieve and F Lichère (eds) Public 
Procurement Law: Damages as an Effective Remedy (Oxford, Hart, 2011). 
91 Along these lines, see Sauter (n 3) 312-3, who considered that ‘once it is clear that not all relevant 
conditions are met the process stalls and intervention by the Commission becomes necessary in order to 
determine whether a case of exemptable aid is involved. A complaint to the Commission—which has 
now made its strategic priorities in the utilities sectors abundantly clear—will then be the only remedy, 
with generally a limited chance of success’. 
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European Commission issued a decision on the compatibility of the aid. Indeed, as 
indicated in the Notice on the Enforcement of State Aid Law by National Courts  
National court proceedings in State aid matters may sometimes concern the 
applicability of a Block Exemption Regulation or an existing or approved aid 
scheme, or both. Where the applicability of such a Regulation or scheme is 
at stake, the national court can only assess whether all the conditions of the 
Regulation or scheme are met. It cannot assess the compatibility of an aid 
measure where this is not the case, since that assessment is the exclusive 
responsibility of the Commission92. 
However, in my view, this may create a difficulty that is more apparent than 
practical since the conclusion that the contracting authority has breached EU 
procurement rules will allow review bodies and courts to adopt the necessary 
measures to prevent the contract from being awarded and, ultimately, any implicit 
State aid to become effective (regardless of its alleged compatibility)93. Indeed, in 
view of the breach of the public procurement rules (and exclusively on that basis), 
the review body or the court will be perfectly capable of (actually, will be forced to) 
declaring the relevant decision (generally, the award of the contract) illegal and, 
consequently, set it aside and/or render it ineffective (above §3.1)94. In that regard, 
there will be no need for a further State aid investigation by the European 
Commission, since it would be superfluous to try to justify a breach of the EU 
public procurement rules on the basis of the rules on State aid (since, regardless of 
the circularity of the general test discussed above §2.1, it is precisely compliance 
with procurement rules that excludes the existence of State aid). 
Moreover, given the insertion of compliance with public procurement rules 
as a condition for the compatibility of the aid measure—at least in the case of SGEI 
(above §2.3), but more generally as an attempt by the European Commission to 
increase the effectiveness of public procurement rules—it seems highly implausible 
that a compatibility decision could be adopted by the European Commission in any 
case where the contracting authority has not followed the required procedures, or 
has breached the general principles of the EU procurement system (and, 
remarkably, the principles of transparency, equal treatment or competition). Even 
in the specific case of the rejection of tenders tainted by illegal State aid [above 
§2.2, and particularly in view of art 69(4) of the new public procurement Directive], 
it should be stressed that it is incumbent upon the tenderer to prove that the aid 
used to subsidise the apparently abnormally low tender was legal at the time of 
                                                          
92 Notice on the Enforcement of State Aid Law by National Courts (n 35) ¶16. 
93 Admittedly, the problem is much more relevant in the opposite situation, where the court finds no 
breach of EU procurement rules or, despite minor, formal breaches, decides to let the procurement 
decision stand and remain effective—in which cases the self-standing consideration of State aid rules 
would need to be addressed before the European Commission due to its exclusive (positive) 
competence to declare compatibility. However, tackling those issues, which are not connected to 
(sufficiently relevant) breaches of public procurement rules, remains outside the scope of these 
proposals and analysis. 
94 Nonetheless, it must be reckoned that, in those instances in which ineffectiveness is not an 
adequate remedy from a public procurement perspective (and Member States have substituted it for 
monetary penalties against the contracting authority), the effectiveness of State aid rules can be 
jeopardised. In those cases, it could be necessary to impose ineffectiveness in order to ensure the effet 
utile of State aid rules (below §3.3) and not strictly speaking as a ‘public procurement remedy’. 
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submitting the tender (or, at the latest, at the time of award of the contract). Any 
subsequent decision by the European Commission would not need to be taken into 
consideration, given that it would not have sanatory or retrospective effects. 
Therefore, in view of the lack of need for any further investigation by the 
European Commission when public procurement rules have not been followed and, 
as a result, there is an element of illegal (unlawful) State aid in the award of the 
contract; in my opinion, there is no obstacle in the allocation of competences for 
the enforcement of Article 107 TFEU that prevents configuring public procurement 
review bodies and courts as ‘State aid courts’ for the purposes of the simultaneous 
enforcement of both sets of rules in a single setting of ‘private’ litigation. 
3.3. The general duty to ensure the effet utile of State aid rules across the 
public procurement remedies system 
If public procurement review bodies and courts are to work as ‘State aid courts’ in 
the joint enforcement of both sets of rules, it is important to clarify the extent of 
their duty to take State aid issues into account when dealing with procurement 
challenges. In my opinion, review bodies and courts within the public procurement 
remedies system are under a general obligation to ensure the effet utile of State aid 
rules across the board and to prevent illegal State aid from generating any 
anticompetitive effects. This has been recognised by the CJEU in CELF II 
The last sentence of Article [108(3) TFEU] is based on the preservative 
purpose of ensuring that incompatible aid will never be implemented. The 
intention of the prohibition thus effected is therefore that compatible aid 
alone may be implemented. In order to achieve that purpose, the 
implementation of planned aid is to be deferred until the doubt as to its 
compatibility is resolved by the Commission’s final decision […]. 
The objective of the national courts’ tasks is therefore to pronounce 
measures appropriate to remedy the unlawfulness of the implementation of 
the aid, in order that the aid does not remain at the free disposal of the 
recipient during the period remaining until the Commission makes its 
decision.95 
In my view, this is simply an emanation or specific case of the duty of 
sincere cooperation imposed by Article 4(3) TEU96—which is one of the pillars of the 
system of ‘private’ litigation, both of State aid rules97 and public procurement98. 
Consequently, review bodies and (administrative) courts are under a positive 
obligation to identify the possible existence of illegal State aid (ie non-notified or 
                                                          
95 Case C-1/09 CELF and Ministre de la Culture et de la Communication [2010] ECR I-2099 ¶¶29-30. 
For discussion, see T Jaeger, ‘CELF II: Settling into a Weak effet utile Standard for Private State Aid 
Enforcement’ (2010) 1(4) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 319. 
96 The basis of these obligations was established in Case C-80/86 Kolpinghuis [1987] ECR 3969 ¶12. 
On the extension of these duties not only to national courts, but also and notably to national 
authorities, see J Temple Lang, ‘The Duty of National Courts under Community Constitutional Law’ 
(1997) 22 European Law Review 3; ibid, ‘The Duty of National Authorities under European 
Constitutional Law’ (1998) 23 European Law Review 109, 114; T Tridimas, The General Principles of 
EU Law, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006) 44-7; and JH Jans et al, Europeanisation of 
Public Law (Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2007) 111-2. 
97 Notice on the Enforcement of State Aid Law by National Courts (n 35) ¶77. 
98 Treumer (n 84) 26. 
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unlawful State aid, as will typically be the case of the aid implicit in the improper 
award of a public contract). In this regard, it is worth stressing that a breach of 
public procurement rules will, in a significant number of cases (and almost in all 
cases involving SGEI) imply the existence of (potential) unlawful State aid, which 
the (review bodies) and the courts are under an obligation to identify99. Once that 
possibility is identified, they should draw all appropriate legal consequences to 
prevent the unlawful State aid from generating any effects (and, by implication, to 
prevent the award of the contract)100. 
As mentioned in passing, this is particularly clear in the litigation concerned 
with the treatment of abnormally low tenders tainted with illegal State aid [Article 
55(3) of Directive 2004/18—and, even more so, in connection with Article 69(4) of 
the new public procurement Directive; above §2.2], in relation to which it can be 
argued that there is a general obligation to dismiss them in order to ensure the 
effet utile of the provisions in Article 107 TFEU and Regulation 659/1999 [coupled 
with Art 108(3) TFEU]101. This issue was touched upon in the ARGE case, where the 
CJEU had to address the more general issue of the potential participation of 
recipients of State aid in public procurement procedures—which was challenged on 
the basis that allowing them to participate would be a breach of the principle of 
non-discrimination. In that case, the CJEU found that 
the mere fact that the contracting authority allows bodies receiving subsidies 
of any kind, whether from that contracting authority or from other 
authorities, which enable them to submit tenders at prices appreciably lower 
than those of the other, unsubsidised, tenderers to take part in a procedure 
for the award of a public service contract does not amount to a breach of the 
principle of equal treatment.102 
Nonetheless, allowing the recipients of State aid to participate does not mean 
that the authority cannot be bound by a more general obligation to ensure the effet 
utile of the State aid rules and, consequently, to reject their abnormally low offers if 
they are tainted by illegal (unlawful) State aid. As the CJEU also said in ARGE 
it is not excluded that, in certain specific circumstances [the procurement 
Directive] requires or at the very least allows, the contracting authorities to 
take into account the existence of subsidies, and in particular of aid 
incompatible with the Treaty, in order, where appropriate, to exclude 
tenderers in receipt of such aid (emphasis added). 
Consequently, it is submitted that domestic courts (and procurement review 
bodies) are under a general obligation to ensure that tenders tainted with illegal 
State aid are rejected in order to ensure the effet utile of the TFEU provisions on 
State aid and, consequently, they cannot make it excessively burdensome to 
challenge the award of a public contract on the basis of an abnormally low tender 
                                                          
99 Ibid ¶¶8-13. 
100 Ibid ¶28 and the case law cited therein, which I consider applicable by analogy, if not directly. 
Similarly, Treumer (n 84) 24 uses the existence of illegal State aid as an example of a contract that 
should have never been entered into and that, consequently, should be terminated. 
101 Cfr Ølykke, ‘How Should the Relation between Public Procurement Law and Competition Law Be 
Addressed in the New Directive?’ (2012) 70. 
102 Case C-94/99 ARGE [2000] ECR I-11037 ¶32. 
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tainted with illegal State aid. This obligation will be particularly strong when the 
State aid in question has been the object of a prior negative decision by the 
European Commission, given the even stronger link of such situation with the 
direct effect of Article 108(3) TFEU and the duty of the courts to take full account of 
its effectiveness when preserving the interests of the individuals concerned103. This 
will be relevant in the setting of the tendering of SGEI, given that these provisions 
are equally applicable. Moreover, in case the tenderer has already received the 
entrustment for the provision of other SGEI, the rules on financial transparency104 
and the need to avoid cross-subsidies between SGEI105 will strengthen this 
conclusion. Finally, such duty to ensure the effet utile of State aid rules across the 
public procurement remedies system must be taken into consideration when a 
purposive interpretation of the public procurement rules is required. 
3.4. The issue of legal standing of disappointed tenderers, competitors and 
third parties to challenge procurement decisions with State aid implications 
If the system for the ‘joint litigation’ of public procurement and State aid rules is to 
work effectively, it must be equally accessible to potential claimants under each of 
these sets of rules. From the perspective of public procurement requirements, 
under Article 1(3) of Directive 89/665, ‘Member States shall ensure that the review 
procedures are available […] at least to any person having or having had an interest 
in obtaining a particular contract and who has been or risks being harmed by an 
alleged infringement’. This provision has been implemented in ample terms and 
most Member States are generous in the recognition of active standing to challenge 
public procurement decisions106, which is not limited to the undertakings that have 
effectively participated in the tender. On their part, rules on State aid require that 
‘national rules [do not] limit legal standing only to the competitors of the beneficiary. 
Third parties who are not affected by the distortion of competition resulting from the 
aid measure can also have a sufficient legal interest of a different character’107. 
Both requirements for legal standing seem easy to reconcile, particularly in 
view that both share the same basic principles for the recognition of legal standing. 
On the positive side, both sets of rules require that not only undertakings in close 
competitive relationships with the beneficiary of the measures are allowed to 
challenge the decision. And, on the negative side (or outer limit of legal standing), 
taxpayers or, generally, the public must not necessarily be granted standing to 
challenge any procurement or State aid decisions, unless they can show that they 
risk being harmed by the decision or can otherwise show sufficient legal interest. 
Therefore, bringing State aid complaints within the framework of public 
procurement challenges does not seem to impose any restriction on the legal 
                                                          
103 Notice on the Enforcement of State Aid Law by National Courts (n 35) ¶22, with references to the 
relevant case law. 
104 See Commission Directive 2006/111/EC of 16 November 2006 on the transparency of financial 
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standing required by the principles of equivalence and effectiveness of the 
remedies108—which are equally applicable in the public procurement arena. 
3.5. Commonality of the rules on standstill and (additional) interim measures  
Similarly, public procurement and State aid rules on standstill and (additional) 
interim measures are fundamentally compatible. Within the procurement system, 
and in order to allow sufficient time for effective review of the contract award 
decisions taken by contracting authorities, Article 2a(2) of Directive 89/665 
imposes a mandatory standstill period of at least 10 calendar days (extended to 15 
days where means of electronic communication are not used) after the 
announcement of the award decision, in which the contract cannot be 
concluded109. That is reinforced by Article 2(3), which requires that ‘When a body of 
first instance, which is independent of the contracting authority, reviews a contract 
award decision, Member States shall ensure that the contracting authority cannot 
conclude the contract before the review body has made a decision on the application 
either for interim measures or for review’ and always provided that this ‘suspension 
shall end no earlier than the expiry of the standstill period’. Therefore, contract 
award decisions are subject to a non-waivable standstill period that prevents their 
implementation before sufficient time for a potential challenge has elapsed. 
Moreover, the infringement of this standstill period requires that the contract 
eventually concluded be declared ineffective under the provisions of Article 2d(1)(b) 
if this infringement has deprived the tenderer applying for review of the possibility 
to pursue pre-contractual remedies or has affected its chances to obtain the 
contract. Therefore, public procurement rules envisage automatic standstill and 
provide for the ineffectiveness of the decisions adopted in breach thereof. 
On their part, State aid rules impose a mandatory standstill (without a time 
limit) on Member States, which ‘shall not put [the] proposed [State aid] measures 
into effect until this procedure has resulted in a final decision’ [art 108(3) TFEU]. As 
explained by the Commission 
the standstill obligation laid down in Article [108(3)] of the Treaty gives rise 
to directly effective individual rights of affected parties (such as the 
competitors of the beneficiary). These affected parties can enforce their rights 
by bringing legal action before competent national courts against the 
granting Member State110. 
National courts are obliged to protect the rights of individuals affected by 
violations of the standstill obligation. National courts must therefore draw all 
appropriate legal consequences, in accordance with national law, where an 
infringement of Article [108(3)] of the Treaty has occurred. However, the 
national courts’ obligations are not limited to unlawful aid already 
disbursed. They also extend to cases where an unlawful payment is about to 
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be made. […] Where unlawful aid is about to be disbursed, the national 
court is therefore obliged to prevent this payment from taking place111. 
Consequently, national courts are also under a clear obligation to uphold the 
mandatory standstill period and to prevent unlawful State aid from being 
implemented before its compatibility with the EU rules has been declared. 
In my view, the essence of both standstill obligations is the same, and the 
ensuing obligation of the (first instance, independent) review bodies and courts to 
uphold such obligation—or, otherwise, prevent or neutralise the effects of the 
decisions adopted in breach thereof—is almost identical. A joint reading of both 
sets of provisions would allow reconciling their requirements by extending the 
mandatory standstill foreseen in the public procurement rules until a final decision 
is adopted by the review body [along the lines of art 2(3) dir 98/665] when there is 
an allegation that the infringement of the procurement rules would imply the 
disguised granting of State aid (above §2.1), would contravene the rules applicable 
to the financing of SGEI (above §2.3), or would deprive from the effectiveness of 
Article 107 TFEU if an abnormally low tender tainted by illegal State aid was 
accepted (above §2.2). In all these cases, given that the standstill obligation derived 
from the State aid rules would run for longer than the procurement Alcatel 
standstill obligation112, and even if the parties had failed to expressly request the 
extension of the standstill period as an interim measure, the review body or the 
court should automatically extend it until the end of the challenge procedure. 
In any case, parties could apply for an extension of the standstill as an 
interim measure, both under procurement [art 2(1)(a) dir 89/665] and State aid 
rules113. And, in those cases, the review body or the court would apply similar 
standards of fumus boni iuris and periculum in mora to reach a decision. 
3.6. Possibility to claim damages and their subjection to domestic law of the 
Member States 
One last element that deserves consideration in order to ensure that channelling 
State aid issues through the public procurement remedies system does not deprive 
the State aid rules of their effectiveness is the compatibility of the provisions on 
claims for damages in both sets of rules at the EU level. 
The Remedies Directives expressly regulate the powers of public 
procurement review bodies and courts to award damages to persons harmed by an 
infringement [art 2(1)(c) dir 89/665], but it is for the domestic law of the Member 
States ‘to determine the measures necessary to ensure that the review procedures 
effectively award damages to persons harmed by an infringement of the law on 
public contracts’114. Moreover, the CJEU has configured the right to claim damages 
under Article 2(1)(c) of Directive 89/665 as implying objective liability, since it 
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cannot be made conditional upon proving that the infringement of public 
procurement rules was culpable115. This is in line with the case law of the CJEU in 
the area of damages derived from illegal State aid, whereby ‘as part of their role 
under Article [108(3)] of the Treaty, national courts may also be required to uphold 
claims for compensation for damage caused to competitors of the beneficiary and to 
other third parties by the unlawful State aid’116. Identically to the situation in the 
public procurement sphere, actions for damages ‘are obviously dependent on 
national legal rules. Therefore, the legal bases on which claimants have relied in the 
past vary significantly across the [EU]’117. But, in any case, the liability for damages 
due to an infringement of State aid rules and, particularly, the breach of the 
mandatory standstill in Article 108(3) TFEU has also been configured in objective 
terms, given that there is a large body of case law and Commission guidance that 
excludes any possibility to claim that the infringement was excusable118. 
Regardless of the disparities in the rules applicable to the damages that can 
be obtained as compensation for an infringement of procurement and State aid 
rules across the 28 jurisdictions of the Member States—which are not unique to 
these areas of EU law, but a general difficulty for the effectiveness of EU 
competition law (and, more generally, EU law) that derives from the lack of EU 
competence for the harmonisation of tort law119—it is also clear that the heads of 
damages or legal bases for such claims is equally available in the ambit of public 
procurement and that of State aid remedies. Consequently, also in this important 
aspect, the unification of the ‘private’ litigation of public procurement and State aid 
rules shows no impediment from the point of view of EU law. 
Regarding specific issues, such as the quantification of the damages, there 
can still be some need for harmonization of the guidance and case law in this area. 
Even if the European Commission has suggested that, in those cases where the 
claims for damages focuses on lost profit, ‘Determining the actual amount of lost 
profit will be easier where the unlawful aid enabled the beneficiary to win over a 
contract or a specific business opportunity from the claimant. The national court can 
then calculate the revenue which the claimant was likely to generate under this 
contract. In cases where the contract has already been fulfilled by the beneficiary, 
the national court would also take account of the actual profit generated’; in the 
public procurement setting, compensation for lost profit is still not the universal 
rule and there are significant disparities across the Member States120. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
As this paper has shown, there is a growing area of State aid litigation that is 
intrinsically linked to public procurement procedures. There are three main groups 
of cases where public procurement litigation phagocytises State aid ‘private 
litigation’ because: i) compliance with public procurement rules or lack thereof 
implies the (in)existence of State aid under Article 107(1) TFEU (§2.1); ii) 
(non)compliance with public procurement rules prevents the exemption of State aid 
to SGEI under the rules of the Almunia Package for the application of Article 106(2) 
TFEU (§2.2); or iii) the rejection of abnormally low tenders tainted by illegal 
(unlawful) State aid is the only option conducive to the effectiveness of Article 
108(3) TFEU (§2.3). These groups of cases constitute around 5% of the State aid 
litigation in the Member States, although a trend of expansion seems clear. 
In light of this convergence or ‘unification’ of the ‘private’ litigation of State 
aid rules and challenges against breaches of the EU public procurement rules—
which is particularly strong in the area of SGEI—this paper has assessed whether 
the procedural rules applicable to both types of litigation are compatible and 
whether EU law poses any impediments against configuring public procurement 
review bodies and courts as ‘State aid courts’ for the purposes of the simultaneous 
enforcement of both sets of rules in a single setting of ‘private’ litigation. The 
argument of the different distribution of competences between Member States and 
the Commission in each of these areas of EU Economic Law has been dispelled 
(§3.2) and, following the recognition of a general duty of procurement review bodies 
and courts to ensure the effet utile of the State aid rules (§3.3), it has been shown 
that there is nothing in the rules on legal standing (§3.4), standstill periods and 
interim measures (§3.5) or the possibility to claim damages (§3.6) that alters such 
conclusion. 
It has also been submitted that using the public procurement system in this 
way provides effective remedies for the enforcement of the Almunia Package for the 
financing of SGEI and, consequently, can strengthen its effectiveness. 
